

# Computer-Assisted Proofs and Mathematical Understanding

## the case of Univalent Foundations

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The computer-assisted proof of Four Colour Map theorem (4CT) published by Kenneth Appel, Wolfgang Haken and John Koch back in 1977 [1] prompted a continued philosophical discussion on the epistemic value of computer-assisted mathematical proofs [10],[9],[3],[2],[7],[8]. We briefly overview this discussion and then show how the Univalent Foundations of Mathematics (UF) meets some earlier stressed epistemological concerns about computer-assisted proofs and thus offers a new possibility to fill the gap between computer-assisted and traditional mathematical proofs. We demonstrate the argument with a proof of basic theorem in Algebraic Topology formalised in UF and implemented in AGDA [6].

## 1 Overview

In their proof of 4CT Appel and his co-authors used a low-level computer code written specifically for this purpose in order to check one by one 1482 different cases (configurations), which was not feasible by hand. More recently a fully formalised version of Appel&Haken&Koch's proof has been implemented with Coq [4]. A philosophical discussion on this proof has been started by Thomas Tymoczko [10] who argues that the computer-assisted proof of 4CT does not qualify as mathematical proof in anything like the usual sense of the word because the computer part of this proof cannot be surveyed and verified in detail by human mathematician or even a group of human mathematicians. On this ground Tymoczko suggests that the computer-assisted proof of 4CT represents a wholly new kind of *experimental* mathematics akin to experimental natural sciences, where the computer plays the role of experimental equipment.

Paul Teller in his response to Tymoczko [9] argues that Tymoczko misconceives of the concept of mathematical proof by confusing the epistemic notion of verification that something is a proof of a given statement with this proof itself, which under Teller's general conception of mathematical proof has no intrinsic epistemic content in it. Assuming that the published proof of 4CT is indeed a proof, Teller argues that it is unusual only in how one gets an epistemic access (if any) to it but that, contra Tymoczko, there is nothing unusual in the involved concept of mathematical proof itself.

Commenting on Teller's analysis in 2008 Dag Prawitz [7] approves on Teller's distinction between a proof and its verification. However since Prawitz's conception of proof unlike Teller's is essentially epistemic, Prawitz comes to a different conclusion. Contra Teller and in accordance with Tymoczko Prawitz argues that *if* Appel&Haken&Koch's alleged proof is indeed a proof then it comprises a crucial empirical evidence provided by computer and thus is not deductive.

Mic Detlefsen and Mark Luker in their response to Tymoczko [3] quite convincingly show that the difference between the computer-assisted proof of 4CT and traditional mathematical proofs is less dramatic than Tymoczko says. For traditional mathematical proofs quite often, and perhaps even typically, comprise some “blind” symbolic calculations like one that is needed in order to compute the product  $50 \times 101 = 5050$ . How much a given symbolic calculation is epistemically transparent or blind, is, according to Detlefsen&Luker, a matter of degree rather than a matter of principle.

## 2 Local and Global Surveyability of Mathematical Proofs

O. Bradley Bassler [2] suggests to distinguish between *local* and *global* surveyability of mathematical proofs. By local surveyability of proof  $p$  Bassler understands the property of  $p$  that makes it possible for a human to follow each elementary step of  $p$ . Bassler argues that local surveyability of  $p$  does not, by itself, make  $p$  epistemically transparent or surveyable in the usual intended sense because on the top of local surveyability it requires at least a minimal *global* surveyability, which allows one to see that all steps of  $p$  taken together provide  $p$  with a sufficient epistemic force that warrants its conclusion on the basis of its premises. In the historical part of his paper Bassler shows that there is an unfortunate tendency to neglect the global surveyability in proofs by assuming that it reduces to the local one.

When one applies the distinction between local and global surveyability in the analysis of Appel&Haken&Koch’s proof of 4CT the resulting picture is more complex than one suggested by Tymoczko [10]. The computer part of the proof is fully locally surveyable in the sense that each piece of the computer code can be checked and interpreted by human (since it is written by human). Arguments explaining why the computation so encoded, if performed correctly, completes the proof of the theorem, which Appel&Haken&Koch present in the form of traditional mathematical prose, provide a global survey of this proof and of this computation in particular. What this proof still lacks is rather an expected surveyability and traceability at the intermediate scale between the general understanding of what the given computation computes and the low-level computational steps expressed with the program code.

## 3 Univalent Foundations and Spatial Intuition

Homotopy Type theory (HoTT), which is the mathematical core of UF [5], allows one to think of formal derivations in Martin-Löf Type theory (MLTT) as homotopical spatial constructions. When this base calculus or its fragment is implemented in the form of programming code then the same homotopical interpretation along with the associated spatial intuition applies to the code. This spatial (homotopical) intuition makes formal symbolic derivations and the corresponding programming code humanly surveyable in a new way: on the top of the *local* surveyability that allows one to control elementary steps of the process, and in addition to the high-scale *global* surveyability that provides one with a general understanding of the resulting construction, the homotopical spatial intuition provides an epistemic access to the intermediate mesoscopic level of this construction, which allows one to follow and control all significant steps of formal reasoning ignoring its minute details. Such an intuitive reading of the formalism bridges the usual gap between the rigour formal representation of mathematical reasoning with logical calculi, on the one hand, and the conventional representations of mathematical reasoning,

which typically heavily use various symbolic means of expression without strict syntactic rules, on the other hand. Thus HoTT supports a representation of mathematical reasoning in general and mathematical proof in particular, which is:

- fully formal in the sense that it uses a symbolic calculus with an explicit rigorous syntax;
- computer-checkable;
- supported by a spatial (homotopical) intuition that balances local and global aspects of mathematical intuition in the usual way.

A simple (but not trivial) example of mathematical proof represented in this way is found in [6]. It is a proof of basic theorem in Algebraic Topology according to which the fundamental group  $\pi_1(S^1)$  of (topological) circle is  $S^1$  (isomorphic to) the infinite cyclic group  $\mathbb{Z}$ , which is canonically represented as the additive group of integers.

Let *base* be a point of given circle  $S^1$  (the base point). This judgement is formally reproduced with the MLTT syntax as formula

$$b : S^1$$

Then loops associated with this base point are terms of form:

$$loop : b =_{S^1} b$$

The resulting formal proof and its implementation in a programming code are interpretable in terms of such intuitive spatial (homotopical) constructions all the way through.

## 4 Conclusion

The UF-based approach in computer-assisted theorem proving allows the user to follow mathematical arguments at the crucial mesoscopic level of the proof structure, which is necessary for human understanding of mathematical proofs in anything like the usual sense of the word. In this case a computer-assisted proof does no longer appear as a “black box proof” where significant parts of the argument remain epistemically opaque and are replaced by non-deductive empirical evidences. This feature makes UF-based formal computer-assisted proofs quite like traditional mathematical proofs in accordance with the general line of Detlefsen&Luker’s argument [3].

## References

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